Under the law, legislators can be disqualified from state or national legislatures if they resign from their party or defy the whip. But that has done little to stop politicians from moving parties
In recent years governments in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Goa have all fallen in a similar fashion, all to the BJP’s gain. Defectors tend to be enticed by the promise of money and power. But in theory they should be unable to jump ship. In 1985 India’s government introduced a law designed to curb “the evil of political defections”.
Defections have long been rife in Indian politics. Nearly half of politicians elected to the national and state governments between 1967 and 1971 switched parties. One even did so three times in a single day. Under the law, legislators can be disqualified from state or national legislatures if they resign from their party or defy the whip. The law’s proponents argue that because Indians vote for parties, not individual politicians, switching after an election violates their mandate.
Yet the law has done little to stop politicians from moving parties. The decision on disqualification rests with the speaker of the house, who is supposed to provide an impartial verdict. That is rarely the case, because the speaker often belongs to the party benefiting from the defections. And in many cases exceptions prevent the judiciary from punishing defectors. Anti-defection charges do not apply if rebels account for more than two-thirds of the party they are quitting, for example.
According to PRS Legislative Research, a think-tank in Delhi, 40 countries have some sort of anti-defection law, but only six have a rule that prevents politicians from voting against party orders. Critics say that India’s law makes politicians less accountable, and that party diktats suffocate debate and concentrate decision-making in a handful of leaders.
The Supreme Court disagrees. It has repeatedly called for the law to be strengthened. But any change is unlikely, since it would require the support of the BJP, which has little incentive to alter a status quo that gives parties control over individual members while doing little to stop mass defections that often benefit it. Between 2016 and 2020, some 443 state legislators switched parties. Nearly half ended up with the BJP.